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I. INTRODUCTION
HE distribution agreement is one of the most common and impor-
tant legal instruments in the field of foreign investment. In such
agreement, a distributor agrees to commercialize a supplier's
products in a determined territory and under certain terms. Unlike some
legal systems, Mexican law does not regulate distribution agreements and
thus its parties are able to negotiate its clauses freely. During the negoti-
ation, small Mexican distributors, particularly at the beginning of the
commercial relationship, usually are either not aware of the importance
of these issues or do not have enough leverage to negotiate protective
clauses such as indemnity, termination, or exclusivity. In many instances,
Mexican distributors do not want to appear too demanding because of
the risk of having the potential supplier choose another distributor.
In practice, this lack of proper protection may result in a case where a
Mexican distributor opens up the Mexican market to a foreign supplier to
*L.L.M, Harvard Law School, May 2008. Licenciado en Derecho, Facultad Libre de
Derecho de Monterrey, May 2007. B.A., Elmhurst College, February 2002.
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find that, after years of hard work, it is being left out without just cause or
compensation. Some countries like Puerto Rico and El Salvador have
opted to regulate distribution agreements, defining and specifying obliga-
tions and rights for both the supplier and distributor, and establishing
strong penalties and indemnities for issues such as the early termination
of the agreement.
In 2002, attempting to create a more balanced agreement, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce (ICC) published a Model Form for Inter-
national Sole Distributorship, clarifying the rights and obligations for
both the distributor and supplier.' Although it has no formal enforceabil-
ity, such contract has become an important instrument within interna-
tional commercial practice because of the influence of the ICC. The ICC
model contract was based on the customs and rules of international com-
merce and was drafted without any governmental intervention. This
model contract will be addressed throughout this article.
This article evaluates the importance of a distribution agreement as a
foreign investment instrument in Mexico and the problems caused by its
lack of protection, especially for small to medium size distributors.
Problems related to distribution agreements such as short duration, un-
willingness to renew, and early termination by the supplier, without
cause, will be addressed. In particular, this article will analyze different
compensation schemes, triggered by the early termination of the agree-
ment. Finally, a policy reform proposal will be put forward, which will
provide for the regulation of such agreement in Mexico.
II. ROLE IN COMMERCE
The importance of the distribution agreement is related to its economic
efficiency. On the one hand, it allows a supplier to mass-produce at
wholesale prices, without worrying about retail distribution or consumer-
level sale liabilities. On the other hand, it allows a distributor to concen-
trate its efforts solely on the retail distribution or sale of a product, not
worrying about complex issues such as product development and manu-
facturing. In such relationship, the distributor often operates within a
market and territory it already knows and with a product already ac-
cepted by the public. In other words, each party concentrates on what it
does best.
The supplier usually looks for the simple and affordable distribution of
its products, seeking to reduce its efforts and expenses as much as possi-
ble. Distributors, on the other hand, generally have a privileged position
in terms of marketing and points of sale. In this sense, the distributor
becomes the "extended arm of the supplier."'2
1. INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE [ICC], MODEL FORM OF INTERNATIONAL SOLE
DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACTS, (2002). [hereinafter MODEL FORM].
2. Josd Luis Iglesias Prada, Notas para el Estudio del Contrato de Concesi6n Mercan-
til, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO MERCANTIL EN HOMENAJE A RODRIGO URIA, 254
(1978).
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A good potential supplier has accumulated experience in product de-
velopment as well as adequate elements for manufacturing, such as the
right technology and personnel. In most cases, the distributor lacks all of
the above, but is located within a market that is attractive for the sup-
plier. This means that the distributor knows its potential clients, and their
necessities. In fact, one of the most sought-after elements in a distributor
is proximity to the ultimate consumer. Conversely, the distributor often
looks for a product that has proven successful in the past and which is
manufactured by an experienced supplier.
In general, the distribution agreement is a very efficient instrument
that captures an essential economic necessity, and is therefore commonly
used. According to the ICC, the distribution agreement is the most used
instrument in the field of international trade and commerce 3 . Yet, sur-
prisingly, the distribution agreement tends not to be regulated. The ICC
confirms this notion: "like commercial agency agreements, distributorship
agreements suffer from the absence of a set of uniform rules governing
the rights of the parts."'4
III. ORIGIN
Contrary to other commercial agreements that date back to the Middle
Ages, the distribution agreement is a product of the industrial revolu-
tion.5 Mass production, which experienced a tremendous boom during
that period, was a force that pushed towards creation of this legal instru-
ment. Although it is unclear exactly when it was born, some of the first
accounts of the distribution agreement refer to the beer distribution in-
dustry in early nineteenth century Germany. 6 Later on, at the end of that
century, distribution agreements were commonly held with the specific
objective of regulating the import and export of certain products.7 Dur-
ing the 1920s, such agreements became more frequent within the U.S.
automobile industry.8 During the second half of the twentieth century, as
international companies such as Pepsi and Coca-Cola started to consoli-
date, the distribution agreement became an essential legal instrument
used by businesspersons in different countries.
Usually unregulated, the distribution agreement has developed within
the realm of the Lex Mercatoria, or usual commercial practices. Its lack
of regulation in Mexico causes various legal and commercial problems,
which will be addressed in the next section.
3. ICC, THE ICC MODEL DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACT: SOLE IMPORTER-DISTRIBU-
TOR (2004), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/id274/index.html
4. Id.
5. Iglesias, supra note 5, at 253.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 2 EDUARDO CHULIA VICINT & TERESA BELTRAN ALANDETE, ASPECTOS
JURtDICOS DE LOS CONTRATOS ATfPIcOS 333 (vol. 2 1995).
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IV. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY LACK OF REGULATION
The lack of regulation of the distribution agreement in Mexico causes
uncertainty between parties to the agreement, especially when their rela-
tionship takes a wrong turn. Sparse legislation has only been supple-
mented by secondary regulation, applicable only to some of the effects of
the distribution agreement, such as antitrust issues, but not to the agree-
ment itself. The above situation is not very different in other countries.
Although there are exceptions, most countries do not specifically regulate
distribution agreements.
This lack of regulation gives latitude to foreign suppliers to impose all
kinds of burdensome clauses on small and mid-size distributors, who are
compelled to accept such clauses because of the risk of having the sup-
plier terminate or not renew the agreement. Examples of the type of
conditions that the supplier commonly imposes on the distributor include
the supplier's ability to: (i) unilaterally terminate the agreement without
just cause or compensation for the distributor, who is sometimes left with
dead inventory and uncollectable accounts receivable, (ii) unilaterally
modify important clauses such as exclusivity or the applicable distribution
territory, (iii) get away with the non-compliance of important obligation
under the agreement without a penalty or contractual remedy, and (iv)
specify a very short agreement duration, which does not guaranty that the
distributor will recover its investment. These kinds of clauses emphasize
the need to level the playing field between the parties of the agreement.
Unlike the distribution agreement, the franchise agreement is regu-
lated by Mexican law, protecting the franchisee against early termination
by the franchisor. The regulation establishes that any party that unilater-
ally terminates the agreement without cause shall pay damages to the
other party.9 This article contends that the distribution agreement should
be regulated in a similar manner.
V. ESSENTIAL CLAUSES
Some of the fundamental clauses in the distribution agreement are ex-
clusivity, duration, termination, and compensation.
A. EXCLUSIVITY
Exclusivity is not a formal or necessary element of the distribution
agreement; it must be agreed upon by the parties. Such clause is very
important, especially for the distributor. Without exclusivity, the distrib-
utor's position in the market is uncertain. In its model contract, the ICC
suggests granting exclusivity in favor of the distributor in a determined
geographic territory;10 the reasoning behind this is that if the distributor
is dedicating time and resources to the distribution, it should get some
security in exchange. Ideally, if the supplier breaches this clause, the dis-
9. Ley de la Propiedad Industrial, art. 142 BIS 3 (Mexico).
10. MODEL FORM, supra note 4, at cl. 1.1.
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tributor should have the right to ask for damages or terminate the agree-
ment. Having such territorial exclusivity prevents distributors from
entering into price wars with other distributors of the same supplier that
could bring about a "race to the bottom" effect.
Exclusivity can also be granted in favor the supplier; in such case, a
distributor would be forced only to commercialize products of a certain
supplier. Some distribution agreements prohibit the distributor buying
products from any other supplier, whether it is a competitor or not. The
ICC suggests in its model contract that the distributor should be allowed
to sell a second supplier's products, provided they are not in competition
with the first supplier's products. II
B. DURATION
Duration is a crucial clause for the distributor because most distribu-
tion operations are based on medium or long-term business objectives.
Yet, suppliers frequently force distributors to enter into one-year con-
tracts, thus keeping an "easy way out" from the relationship.
Usually, the distributor invests a considerable amount of money to
build or set up proper facilities, train personnel, and carry out marketing
campaigns. Yet, such agreements often only have a very short duration;
thus, unless the agreement is renewed at the end of the year, the distribu-
tor has a hard time recovering its investment. Thus the renewal is often
left to the discretion of the supplier.
This situation can be observed within the Mexican automobile industry.
International automobile manufacturers usually sell their cars through in-
dependent distributors, commonly referred as dealerships. Therefore
dealerships are forced to make significant long-term investments such as
building appropriate facilities, buying enough inventory and spare-parts,
hiring and training permanent personnel, et cetera. Despite these invest-
ments, such distribution agreements usually specify a duration of one
year.
As previously discussed, suppliers sometimes push for a short duration
of the agreement in order to have absolute discretion as to its renewal.
Yet, the informal understanding between the parties often is to hold an
open-ended relationship, which may be renewed except when there has
been a significant breach by the distributor. This obviously creates a very
inconvenient situation for the distributor, who risks serious losses if the
supplier does not grant renewal, including leftover inventory, uncollect-
able accounts receivable, property rental payments, and labor indemni-
ties. Also, one-year agreements usually prevent distributors from
obtaining favorable financing and loans, as credit institutions often de-
mand longer distributorship agreements.
11. Id. at c. 4.2.
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C. TERMINATION
Termination is commonly perceived as the most important clause in
distribution agreements. Here, the ICC suggests that the parties should
hold a meeting three months before the completion of the term to discuss
the possibility of renewal. Early termination, on the other hand, occurs
when one of the parties terminates the agreement prior to the end of the
specified term and may be with or without cause. The ICC suggests that
only where one party substantially breaches the agreement should, the
other party have the right to terminate the agreement with prior notifica-
tion,'2 in other words, to terminate with cause.
The ICC defines substantial breach as: "[a]ny failure by a party to carry
out all or part of its obligations under the contract resulting in such detri-
ment to the other party as to substantially deprive such other party of
what it is entitled to expect under the contract. ' 13 Thus, the ICC model
contract attempts to limit the parties' right to terminate only to those
cases in which there is a breach of an essential obligation. But, in com-
mercial practice, suppliers usually have the right to terminate because of
non-substantial breaches, such as when the distributor does not meet the
minimum inventory numbers, makes late payments to the supplier, does
not respect resale terms, does not perform the marketing efforts de-
manded by the supplier, or hires sub-distributors without the supplier's
authorization. According to the ICC's breach definition, all of the above
would not be considered material breaches that would allow the early
termination of the agreement.
A more serious problem arises when the supplier unilaterally termi-
nates the agreement without any reasonable justification. Here, distribu-
tion agreements with Mexican automobile dealerships are illustrative.
These agreements usually establish that any of the parties may terminate
in advance by means of written notification, even if the distributor com-
plies with all its obligations. Although this clause could be perceived as
being beneficial to both parties, it is usually more adverse for the distribu-
tor because of its invested capital. In addition, the same agreements
often establish that the early termination or cancellation of the agree-
ment, does not grant distributors the right to demand damages or the
return of investment. Thus, in addition to the risk of being left with dead
inventory and uncollectible accounts, the distributor commonly waives
the right to demand any further compensation. Furthermore, after an
early termination, the distributor runs the risk of having the supplier take
over the distributor's market and clients, without any compensation.
VI. COMPENSATION
A very important provision, and something that the supplier rarely
grants, is compensation because of the early termination of the agree-
12. MODEL FORM, supra note 4, at c. 20.1.
13. Id. at cl. 20.2.
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ment. Such compensation may be established in the agreement or man-
dated by law. Some countries offer protection to the distributor in this
respect, providing relief for a distributor when a foreign supplier termi-
nates early the agreement.
Goodwill indemnity attempts to compensate the distributor for the
value created by the distributor in regard to the supplier's products, and
its impact in future sales. Goodwill indemnity may be defined as the "the
benefit and advantage of the good name, reputation, and connection of a
business.., the attractive force which brings in customers. It is the one
thing which distinguishes an old-establishment business from a new busi-
ness at its first start.' '14 Because it takes into account the value added by
the distributor as well as expected earnings, goodwill indemnity can be a
more equitable method to calculate an early termination indemnity. Dif-
ferent jurisdictions set different methods to calculate this compensation. 15
Some of these compensation schemes will be analyzed below.
A. MEXICO
As previously stated, Mexican law does not regulate distribution agree-
ments, much less grant any compensation for its early termination. The
only protection for the distributor is found in article 2104 of the Federal
Civil Code, 16 which prescribes that any party that breaches a contractual
obligation is responsible for damages caused to the other party; but, if a
distribution agreement expressly permits its early termination, then the
above legal provision would not grant any relief.
B. LATIN AMERICA
Latin American countries have created strong protectionist laws in
favor of the distributor, establishing severe penalties against suppliers in
case of early termination without cause. Some of these countries are Pu-
erto Rico, El Salvador, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Costa
Rica. The Puerto Rican Law of Distributorship Contracts of 1964 estab-
lishes perhaps the strongest penalties for noncompliance by the sup-
plier.' 7 In case of early termination without cause or a denied renewal by
the supplier, such law compensates the distributor for its start-up costs,
inventory value, and capital gain of the business. Overall, such indemnity
may amount to the last five years of the distributor's profits.' 8
El Salvador's Commercial Code prescribes a three-month written prior
notice obligation for any party that justifiably desires to terminate the
14. Yoav Salom6n, Termination of Distributorship and Agency Agreements and Cost of
Termination, in INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION LAW 19 (Cristof Siefarth & Dennis
Campbell eds., 2001).
15. See EXHIBIT 2 for detailed compensation schemes in different countries
16. Codigo Civil Federal [C.C.F.] [Federal Civil Code], Art. 2104, 2005 (Mex).
17. Jorge R. Gonzalez, Distribution Relationships in the Latin American Context in
INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION LAW 31 (Cristof Siefarth & Dennis Campbell eds.,
2001).
18. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10 § 278b (2008).
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distribution agreement, allowing the distributor the necessary time to col-
lect all pending commissions and accounts receivable. In case of termina-
tion without cause, the distributor has the right to recover the expenses
incurred in the distribution such as machinery or personal property, as
well as the value of the present inventory plus an indemnity of up to three
years of the distributor's profits. 19 El Salvador's goes even further, estab-
lishing as a penalty for supplier's noncompliance an import ban on its
products.20
C. UNITED STATES
In terms of the supplier's domination, the situation in the United States
is not very different. In regard to this point, Stephen Story, American
legal author writes:
Increasingly, distribution agreements [in the United States] also con-
tain express provisions designed to give manufacturers the upper
hand in distributorship termination disputes. These provisions,
which are generally enforced, include mandatory arbitration provi-
sions, choice of law provisions (stipulating that the law of the sup-
plier's home state applies) and choice of forum provisions
(mandating that any litigation be brought exclusively in the sup-
plier's local courts).21
Yet, some U.S. regulation offers protection to distributors. Such regu-
lation may be found in:
* state commerce laws;
" industry-specific federal and state laws;
* anti-trust laws;
" Uniform Commercial Code
In fact, various legal authors agree that: "If one looks at the percent-
ages, the overall Latin American picture [in regard to the protection of
distributors] is not too different from the picture in the United States." 22
At the federal level, there are industry-specific laws that offer protec-
tion to the distributor, such as the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act 2
3
and the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act.24 Both laws establish
specific standards in the relationship between the parties, preventing any
party to terminate early without a cause.
At the state level, there is a wide variety of industry-specific legislation
in favor of the distributor.2 5 In fact, at least nineteen states, including the
District of Columbia, Illinois, Virginia, and the Virgin Islands, have legis-
19. COMMERCIAL CODE no. 671, art. 397 (El Sal.).
20. COMMERCIAL CODE no. 671, art. 99-B (El Sal.).
21. Stephen E. Story, Distributor Terminations, VA. LAW. MAGAZINE 31 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.vsb.org/docs/valawyermagazine/octOOstory.pdf.
22. Id. at 35.
23. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2801 et. seq. (2008).
24. Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1221 et. seq. (2008).
25. Exhibit 1 displays a summary of the regulation status of the distribution agreement
in different countries.
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lation that limits the supplier's ability to terminate early or to deny the
renewal of the agreement.2 6
Furthermore, antitrust regulation bans unilateral termination when the
objective is ultimately to drive competitors out of the market. Also, U.S.
courts have constantly ruled against suppliers for early termination, call-
ing for the payment of damages in favor of distributors. In some noted
cases, the courts have ordered the parties to continue their relationship
until the distributor recovers its initial investment.2 7
D. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
The ICC suggests in its model contract, to include different compensa-
tion schemes for early termination without cause. One of those schemes
suggests that, where a party does not justify an early termination, the
other party will be entitled to damages equal to the average profits of the
sale of the products for the period the contract would have lasted in the
case of normal termination. In addition, the ICC suggests that the dam-
aged party may be entitled to goodwill indemnity, which consists of:
50% ... of the annual gross profit made with customers introduced
by the Distributor or with customers with whom the Distributor has
significantly increased the volume of business, to be calculated on
the average of the preceding five years (or, if the contract has lasted
less than five years on the average of such duration). 28
The ICC suggests that the above compensation should be granted "in
lieu of any goodwill indemnity or equivalent compensation the Distribu-
tor may be entitled to by virtue of rules of law applicable to the present
contract ("Statutory Indemnity") and will consequently replace such Stat-
utory Indemnity (if any)."'2 9 Here, a foreign supplier may prefer estab-
lishing a specific compensation formula in the agreement, rather than
being subject to a particular country's legal compensation scheme, which
could bring much uncertainty.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mexican distributors are often placed in vulnerable positions in distri-
bution agreements; this is primarily due to the lack of regulation that al-
lows the foreign supplier to keep an uncommitted relationship with its
Mexican counterpart. As discussed, several countries have opted to regu-
late (some excessively) distribution agreements in an effort to balance the
relationship between the parties.
In a law and economics perspective, perhaps the following question
should be asked: if distribution agreements are so unfavorable, why do
Mexican distributors enter into them in the first place? The answer prob-
26. Gonzalez, supra note 23, at 32.
27. Story, supra note 25, at 38.
28. MODEL FORM, supra note 4, at annex XI.
29. Id. at cl. 21.2.
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ably is that such agreements are not so unfavorable as to make distribu-
tors not enter into them. In fact, even with a vulnerable position in the
market, distributors could still run very profitable businesses.
Still, if distributors felt they had more of a locked-in agreement, they
would probably invest more in the distribution, which would eventually
also benefit the supplier; this would bring about more economic social
welfare in the long term. Now, it is clear that very few suppliers would
agree with this analysis; in other words, it would be rare if a supplier
would voluntarily grant more rights to distributors, without receiving any-
thing in return. An apparent and plausible alternative would be to enact
a policy, providing for a more balanced distribution agreement.
Some critics may argue that such a policy could hinder economic trans-
actions and ultimately deter foreign investment Mexico. There are some
arguments that can be made against this notion. First, as was previously
discussed, the franchise agreement has been regulated by Mexican Law
since 2005, imposing damages against the franchisor for early termination
- yet the franchise sector remains one of the fastest-growing foreign in-
vestment areas in Mexico. Of course, one could argue that the franchise
sector is not growing at the same rate that it would if such agreement
were not regulated. Still, the franchise sector does not appear to be slow-
ing down. Similarly, distribution sectors in countries like Puerto Rico do
not appear to be negatively affected after the enactment regulation of the
distribution agreements.
In terms of policy reform, the conditions set forth by the ICC seem to
be appropriate:
" six month written prior notice obligation for any party that desires
to terminate the distribution agreement;
" in the case of early termination without cause, the other party shall
be entitled to damages equal to the average profits of the sale of
the products for the period the contract would have lasted in the
case of normal termination;
* the damaged party may be entitled to goodwill indemnity, based
on the annual gross profit made with customers introduced by the
distributor or with customers with whom the distributor has signif-
icantly increased the volume of business; and
" penalties may be to the benefit of either party.
Another, more subtle, option would be to adopt a policy that estab-
lishes good faith as precondition for distribution contracts. In any case,
the key is to find the right balance between the parties' freedom to con-
tract and more equitable distribution agreements.
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Exhibit 1
Specific
Country Regulation? Applicable Law
Mexico No Rules that apply to atypical, mercantile
contracts.
European Union No Two regulations regarding exclusivity and
antitrust, derived from the application of
article 85(3) of the Rome Treaty.
France No Rules that apply to mercantile contracts.
Spain No Rules that apply to mercantile contracts.
Italy No Rules that apply to mercantile contracts.
Germany No Rules that apply to mercantile contracts.
United States No State commercial law; federal and state
industry-specific legislation; antitrust law,
Uniform Commercial Code
Belgium Yes Belgian Law of July 27, 1961.
Puerto Rico Yes Distribution Agreements Act of 1964.
El Salvador Yes Art. 392 to 399 of Commerce Code.
Costa Rica Yes Ley de Protecci6n al Representante de Casas
Extranjeras [Law for Protection of the
Representative and Distributor of Foreign
Suppliers], no. 6209 (1978) (as reformed by
no. 6333) (Costa Rica).
Colombia No Rules that apply to mercantile contracts of the
Commerce Code of Colombia (Decree 410 of
1971)
Dominican Republic Yes Ley Sobre Protecci6n a los Agentes
Importadores de Mercaderias y Productos
[Law Regarding the Protection of Market and
Product Import Agents], no. 173 (1973)
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Exhibit 2
Country Fault Compensation to Distributor
Mexico Breach of contractual Responsible party is subject to payment of
obligations damages
Puerto Rico Early termination Start-up costs
without a cause or value of inventory
Unwillingness to expected profits from distribution
renew agreement up to 5 years of past distributor's and
continue agreement until conflict is resolved
El Salvador Termination with Distribution expenses
cause but without a 3- value of inventory
month prior notice up to 3 years of past profits
termination without a possible import ban against the products of
cause a foreign supplier, if it fails to comply with
the above conditions
Colombia If parties did not The law prescribes a compensation
specify duration of calculated in the following manner:
agreement and/or amount equivalent to 1/12 of the average of
compensation, and the profits received in the last three years
the supplier incurs in for every year of duration of the agreement,
early termination or the average of all profits received, if the
without cause agreement lasted for less than three years
plus, in the case of early termination
without cause, the supplier shall pay the
distributor an amount, established by
experts, as a compensation for the
distributor's efforts to credit the brand, line
or products or services
The experts shall take into account the
duration, importance and volume of the
business value that the distributor created
during the agreement
Dominican in case of early 5 years of gross income of the distributor
Republic termination without expected earnings
cause possible import ban against the products of
a foreign supplier, if it fails to comply with
the above conditions
Costa Rica Early termination 4 months of gross income for each year or
without a cause; or faction of a year of the agreement's
Unwillingness to duration
renew agreement possible import ban against the products of
a foreign supplier, if it fails to comply with
the above conditions
ICC Early termination 50 % of the annual gross profit made with
without cause customers introduced by the Distributor or
with customers with whom the Distributor
has significantly increased the volume of
business, to be calculated on the average of
the preceding five years (or, if the contract
has lasted less than five years on the
average of such duration)
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